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permission of the authors.Explaining International Differences in Genetically Modiﬁed Food Labeling Regulations
Guillaume P. Gru` ere, Colin A. Carter, and Y. Hossein Farzin
Abstract. More than forty countries have adopted labeling policies for genetically modiﬁed (GM) food
and the regulations vary considerably across countries. We measure the importance of domestic and inter-
national factors implicit in the choice of GM food labeling regulations. Our results show that European and
Asian countries tend to follow the labeling policies of the European Union and Japan, respectively. Coun-
tries producing GM crops are more likely to have less stringent labeling policies. Countries with no labeling
policies are less developed, with relatively large rural economies and are more likely to have ratiﬁed the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
1. INTRODUCTION
The main international actors in food trade have adopted dramatically different positions on the labeling
of genetically modiﬁed (GM) food. In total, more than forty countries have adopted labeling regulations
and the characteristics of the regulations vary greatly (Carter and Gru` ere 2003a, Sheldon 2002, Phillips and
McNeill 2000). At one end of the spectrum, the United States is the largest producer of GM crops, and has
adopted voluntary labeling guidelines for non-GM food. At the other end of the spectrum, the European
Union (EU) has stringent mandatory labeling regulations, and requires the labeling of GM food and GM
ingredients with a 0.9% tolerance level for the adventitious presence of approved GM crops. Australia and
New Zealand have mandatory labeling policies at the 1% level of GM ingredients; Japan requires GM food
labeling at the 5% level for the top three ingredients and has a voluntary labeling system for food guaranteed
to be free of GM ingredients; and South Korea has a 3% mandatory requirement for the top ﬁve ingredients.
Canada is the world’s third largest producer of GM crops and has adopted voluntary labeling guidelines for
non-GM food. Less developed countries are caught in between the EU and the U.S. position on labeling.
Argentina produces GM crops and does not have any labeling requirements. Alternatively, Brazil approved
the production of GM soybeans and requires labeling at the 1% level. China produces GM cotton and leads
the world in funding for public research on agricultural biotechnology (Huang, Rozelle, Pray and Wang
2002), and requires labeling of GM food ingredients at the 1% level.2
In the EU and in Japan, the initial labeling requirements were introduced in response to consumer con-
cerns. They were intended to provide consumer choice and consumer information. However, the mandatory
labeling policies in the EU and Japan have resulted in the virtual disappearance of any labeled GM product
on the food shelves. These policies encourage processors and retailers to avoid using GMingredients in their
food (Carter and Gru` ere 2003b). Thus, mandatory labeling acts as an import barrier against GM crops in
these countries, and has failed to provide consumer choice. Eastern European countries and Russia adopted
labeling regulations comparable to those in the EU, because they are dependent on trade with the EU. And
some South Eastern Asian countries (such as Vietnam or Indonesia) have adopted regulations similar to
those in Japan.
Some developing countries have taken a position on GM food labeling according to their major export
markets, sometimes adopting mandatory labeling policies that do not seem to respond to genuine consumer
concerns or maybe unenforceable. In addition, according to Cohen and Paarlberg (2002), the rich importers’
labeling regulations have been one of the main factors explaining the restricted availability and use of agri-
cultural biotechnology in developing countries. Yet, recent empirical studies have provided evidence of the
beneﬁts of GM crops for many small farmers in developing countries (Qaim and Zilberman 2003, Pray,
Huang, Hu and Rozelle 2002, Ismael, Bennett and Morse 2002, Qaim, Cap and De Janvry 2003).
Previous literature has acknowledged the difﬁculty associated with explaining the heterogeneous pattern
of labeling regulations across countries. Caswell (2000) argued that this “patchwork of regulation” is the
result of domestic rational choices. Mitchell (2002) provided a ﬁrst empirical comparative study of interna-
tional labeling regulations. Using international cross-sectional data, she used logit regressions to explain the
presence of GM food labeling requirements and to test a set of hypotheses. She draws several conclusions.
First countries with higher income are associated with mandatory labeling, but the test for an inverse U-
shaped relationship between income and mandatory labeling failed. Second, countries with biotechnology
crop trials are more likely to mandate labeling, but other export dependence does not make a country more3
likely to have labeling requirements. Importers of food from the United States are less likely to have labeling
requirements.
Some of Mitchell’s results are not robust and she concluded that more work needs to be done to explain
international regulations. More recently, Fulton and Giannakas (2004) analytically compared different GM
labeling and regulation scenarios, and found that labeling regulations and adoption decisions raise conﬂicts
of interest among consumers, farmers, and seed companies. They determined that four main factors affect
the welfare of these different groups: consumer perception, the cost efﬁciency of biotech products, the am-
plitude of marketing margins and the degree of market power among seed companies. Fulton and Giannakas
concluded that there is no easy explanation as to why different labeling regulations have been introduced in
different countries.
Anderson and Jackson (2003) use a general equilibrium model to simulate the effects of the EU mora-
torium on new GM crops. They found that EU producers beneﬁt from the restrictive policies in the EU,
whereas U.S. producers would beneﬁt if there were no regulatory barriers in the EU and elsewhere. They
conclude that producer differences may explain the dramatically different regulatory approaches between
the EU and the United States. Graff and Zilberman (2004) expand this argument, by observing that farmers
and agriculture chemical producers in the EU beneﬁt from having strong regulations covering GM crops and
GM food. Biotech policies in Europe are conventionally attributed to the concerns of European consumers,
but they are also helping European chemical ﬁrms and European farmers.
In this paper, we try to explain international choices of GM food labeling policies using an empirical
approach. We aim to measure what may have motivated different countries to choose their speciﬁc set of
regulations. Using a more recent and a more detailed data set, we will verify the results of Mitchell (2002),
and test additional hypotheses. We evaluate how domestic conﬂicts of interest (consumer versus producers,
environmental activists versus farmers, science versus precaution) and external conﬂicts of interest (trade re-
lationships, trade dependency) can help explain the current international patchwork of labeling regulations.4
We present the data in section 2. In section 3, we use a multivariate descriptive analysis to compare inter-
national labeling regulations. We then show the results of our regression analysis in section 4, and provide
conclusions in section 5.
2. DATA
We have gathered data on GM food labeling regulations for one hundred and eight selected countries
presented in table 1. Our data comes from various sources, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture
Foreign Agricultural Service Attach´ e Reports and a number of published lists of international labeling reg-
ulations (Richey 2003, International Forum on Globalization and the Center for Food Safety 2003, Center
for Food Safety 2004, National Food Processors Association 2004, Kochenderfer 2004, Rao 2004). We
include countries with labeling policies, and countries without labeling regulations but who are producing
GM crops, considering the introduction of a labeling policy or play a key role in world food trade. We treat
the EU as a block of 15 countries (before May 2004), but we also add Germany and Spain as the only two
EU countries producing GM crops. For each country listed in Table 1, we have gathered data on GM food
regulations, crop production, international trade, and political and socio-economic variables. We present a
table of summary statistics for the main variables in the Appendix.
We divide the countries into three categories depending on their labeling policies, and deﬁne the indicator
variable TY P as follows: TY P = 0 for countries with no labeling regulations or guidelines, TY P = 1 for
countries with voluntary labeling, and TY P = 2 for countries with mandatory labeling.1 The regulatory
variables include the threshold level for adventitious presence of GM ingredients (TOL, in %), whether the
regulation includes feed (FEED), meat (MEAT), additives (ADD) and ﬂavoring (FLV ), whether it is
applied to restaurants (REST), and products derived from GM ingredients but without any detectable trace
of the transgenic DNA(DER), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has enforced its regulation as
of April 2004 (ENF).2 We also construct a discrete variable representing the number of ingredients subject
1 Japan and New Zealand have a mixed labeling system, with mandatory GM labeling but voluntary guidelines for non-GM products. For
simplicity we decide to include them in the category of countries with mandatory labeling (TY P = 2).
2 Some countries (such as Russia) have published labeling regulations, but have not enforced them effectively (Richey 2003).5
TABLE 1. List of countries included in the study according to the presence of GM
labeling regulations as of April 2004 (Sources: FAS Attach´ e Reports; Richey 2003).
Region Countries with GM labeling Countries considering
GM labeling
Countries with no labeling
Africa South Africa, Mauritius Cameroun, Ethiopia,
Ivory Coast, Namibia,
Sudan, Zambia
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina-
Faso, Central Africa, Chad, Congo, Congo
D.R., Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya,
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco,
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Syria,
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe
Asia China, Japan, Hong-Kong, In-
donesia, Philippines, South Ko-
rea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
India, Malaysia, Singa-
pore
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kazakhstan,
Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan,
Papua-New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan
Europe European Union, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Norway, Russia, Serbia,
Spain, Switzerland
Georgia Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Iceland, Macedo-
nia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine
Middle
East
Saudi Arabia Israel, United Arabian
Emirates
Iran, Jordan, Oman, Yemen
North
America
Canada, United States Mexico
South
America
Argentina, Brazil, Chile Bolivia, Ecuador Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
Oceania Australia, New Zealand
to the adventitious presence threshold (ING). This variable takes on the value 15 if all ingredients must be
labeled (as in the EU), 0 if no ingredients are subject to requirement, or the number of major ingredients
subject to the regulation.
On the production side, we have data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) database and
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) publications on GM and
total acreage of the four major GM crops (corn, soybeans, cotton and canola) for 1999, 2000, 2001, and
2002. We use these data to compute the average share of transgenic crops among these four crops in
each country (noted as SGMC;SGMS;SGMT;SGMLA). We also have data on the number of varieties
approved as of 2003 (from the AGBIOS database 2003,3 noted Nvar).
To represent the trade variables, we collected import and exports quantities for the four GM crops for
1999, 2000, and 2001 and bilateral trade values for corn between these countries and Japan and the European
3 The AGBIOS Essential Biodafety Database is available for free on the WorldWideWeb at: http://www.essentialbiosafety.info/.6
Union (15 countries), from the FAO database. We also added data on the quantity of exports of soybeans,
canola and cotton (at the four digit ITC level) from each of country to the EU in 1999, 2000 and 2001,
from the EUROSTAT database. We use these data to derive the average trade balances (from year 1999,
2000 and 2001) for each of the four crops (TrI, I 2 fC;S;T;LAg for corn, soybean, cotton and canola),
and we compute the share of corn exports of each country to Japan (XC
jap) and the average share of exports




eu ) for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. We also use the




us). In addition, we have data on the share of agricultural imports in total
merchandise imports (Agshimp) and on the share of exports in total merchandise exports (Agshexp) for
each country, published by the WTO in 1999. We use average trade balances of agricultural chemicals
- pesticides (Pest), insecticides (Insc), and herbicides (Herb) in 1999, 2000 and 2001- from the FAO
database, as proxy variables representing the importance of the chemical industry in each country. Finally,
we add the consumption of fertilizers (Fert, in kg/ha of arable land) to represent the degree of agriculture
intensiﬁcation.
The political factors are difﬁcult to assess quantitatively. We use qualitative data on the level of participa-
tion in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (not signed, signed, ratiﬁed, variable noted CPB), membership
in the WTO (noted WTO) and in the Organization for Economics Cooperation and Development (noted
OECD), and the presence of active environmental campaign of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth against
transgenic crops, obtained from their websites (Green 2 f0;1;2g). We also add the Human Development
Index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which is a composite vari-
able measuring three human development indicators: longevity, knowledge and standards of living.
We set up two proxy variables for the consumer acceptance of GM food, using various international
surveys published in the literature. We derive them by computing a weighted average share of the population
willingness to buy GM food. Given the lack of surveys in many countries, we use two alternative ways to
ﬁll the gap: for the ﬁrst variable (WTB1), we take the average value for each country without data; for the7
second variable (WTB2) we assume that some countries share the same level of consumer acceptance as
their neighboring countries that have the same level of income.4
We add macro-economic measurements of income, such as per capita GDP in 2003 (pGDP), annual
percentage GDP growth from 2000 to 2002 (from the Economist Intelligent Unit and the IMF development
indicators, noted Grwth), and the share of agriculture in total GDP (AG). We also use dummy variables
to represent the different regions of the world (AFR for Africa, ASI for Asia, NAM for North America,
SAM for South America, EUR for continental Europe, MDE for Middle East, and Oceania is omitted in
estimations).
3. MULTIDIMENSIONAL DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
We ﬁrst use descriptive statistics to obtain an initial understanding of the main characteristics of each
labeling policy. We follow a geometric approach, known as principal component analysis (PCA), to identify
the multiple linear correlations between labeling characteristics and countries’ other socio-economic and
political characteristics, without imposing any strong assumptions.
The purpose of PCA is to determine a system of axes (called principal components) on which to project
a set of individual points in order to obtain the least distorted representation of each of the points and their
relative positions across the data set. We have 108 individual countries and 51 variables, and PCA allows us
to observe the multiple correlation across individual countries and across variables on the same projection
plane.
First PCA determines a gravity center for the new representation of the countries, whose coordinates are
the standardized distance to the average of each variable. To minimize the total inertia (dispersion) of the
individual points, the axes are determined by the eigenvectors associated with the largest eigenvalues of
the variance-covariance matrix. The contribution of each axis is obtained by computing the ratio of the
cumulative sum of the eigenvalues corresponding to each axis to the trace of the covariance matrix. We then
4 For instance, under this assumption, India has the same willingness-to-buy GM food as China.8
represent the points in the new set of axes by translating each point into the new space. The axes do not
provide perfectly identiﬁed dimensions, but by associating the countries and the variables with the axes, it
is possible to ﬁnd an interpretation for each of the axes.
3.1. Results: Labeling regulations.
We ﬁrst focus on variables related to the labeling regulations in order to identify the correlation among
labeling systems. We only include the 44 countries with labeling policies or those considering labeling in
the near future.
We obtain two graphical representations, one for the individual countries and the other for the variables
using the new basis. Both representations use the same system of axes, Axis 1 and 2. We show the vari-
ables in the correlation circle in Figure 1. The numbers used for projections are the linear correlations of
the variables with each of the two axes, and thus each coordinate is within [-1,1], inside what is called the
‘correlation circle’. Variables that are better represented are closer to the circle, variables less well repre-
sented are closer to the center. Variables located at opposite one another are negatively correlated, whereas
variables represented at orthogonal positions are not correlated. Variables that lie close to one another are
correlated with each other. Finally the variables closer to the axes are the ones best representing the axes.
By observing the correlation circle (Figure 1), we see that Axis 1 (the horizontal axis) is correlated with
the number of ingredients (ING), whereas Axis 2 (the vertical axis) is correlated with the tolerance level
(TOL). Axis 1 is also correlated with the dummy variables representing the different products covered by
the regulations. We can interpret the ﬁrst principal component associated with this axis as a proxy variable
for the ”coverage” of the labeling policies. The second component, associated with the tolerance level may
be interpreted as the degree of strictness of the labeling policy.
Second, we show the representation of the set of countries on the basis of the two same axes in Figure 2.
The 2-axis representation explain about 98% of the total inertia (variability) of the system. In this ﬁgure,




FIGURE 1. Comparing international labeling policies: representation of the variables
close projections may or may not be correlated. The countries closer to the axis are well represented, and
better represented if they are further from the gravity center.
We ﬁnd that there are four clusters of countries located in each of the four quadrants of Figure 2. The
ﬁrst group in the North West quadrant includes the United States, Canada, Argentina, Hong Kong, Thailand,
Japan, Korea, and Chile. These countries have a tolerance level between 2% and 5% and do not require
all ingredients to be labeled.5 These countries produce or import GM crops, they have adopted a pragmatic
approach to labeling.
At the other extreme, in the South-East quadrant of Figure 2, countries in Europe (the EU, Poland, Hun-
gary, Czech Republic, Croatia, Switzerland and Norway), Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Saudi Arabia,




FIGURE 2. Comparing international labeling policies: representation of the individual countries
China and Brazil have labeling policies including all ingredients, covering a large number of products, and
with a tolerance level of 1% or 0.9%. Countries in Europe tend to follow the EU labeling regulations. East-
ern European countries are expecting to become members of the EU in the near future, and they are trying
to harmonize their regulations with those ones in the EU. Australia and New Zealand were among the ﬁrst
countries to choose to require the labeling of GM food at the 1% level. Saudi Arabia introduced mandatory
labeling of GM food ofﬁcially for religious reasons. Finally three large countries are included in this group:
Brazil, China and Russia. Brazil is a large agricultural exporter to the EU, China exports food to the EU and
Japan, and Russia is also a trade partner of the EU. All the countries in this group have adopted costly and
stringent regulations.11
In the North-East quadrant of the Figure, we ﬁnd ﬁve countries: Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and South Africa. Most of these countries have not enforced their regulations. Based on current information,
their choice of regulation is between the Japanese and EU approach. They have announced a 5% threshold
level, but have not speciﬁed a restriction on the number of ingredients covered in each product. By default,
we assumed that their regulations will cover all ingredients. But a priori, the Asiatic countries in this group
will use a system comparable to the one in Japan or South Korea, who only require the main ingredients in
each product to be labeled. Finally, the fourth group of countries in the South-West quadrant do not have
any precise requirements but intend to introduce mandatory labeling in the near future.
If we take into account the uncertainties related to the last two groups of countries, we can distinguish
three clusters of countries by comparing their labeling approaches: ﬁrst, countries with pragmatic and lower
cost labeling regulations (with voluntary or mandatory labeling); second, countries with stringent and more
comprehensive labeling requirements more costly to set up and enforce; and third countries caught in the
middle that have indicated their intention to implement mandatory labeling and that will follow the EU or
the Japanese approach.
3.2. Index of labeling and other factors.
We conduct further multivariate PCA, presented in Figures 3 and 4. We set up an index representing the
degree of strictness of each labeling policy. Theindex is based on afewassumptions: ﬁrst, the more products
covered, the stricter the labeling; second, labeling policies are more stringent if they are mandatory, if they
are enforced, and if the percentage of GM food in a product implicitly or explicitly labeled as non-GM is
closer to zero. This index is continuous, and is computed with the following formula:
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(1)
We also include the following aggregated variables based on some of the initial variables:














us represents the sum of import share of corn, cotton and soybean from the United
States in each country’s total import;
-Chem = Pest + Insc + Herb is the total net trade balance of agricultural chemicals.
In the correlation circle (Figure 3), the ﬁrst component (Axis 1) is almost perfectly correlated with the
exports of chemicals. The second principal component (Axis 2) is not well correlated with most variables.
There is a third invisible line, a diagonal from the lower left to the upper right panel in ﬁgure 3, which is





partially correlated with the chemical exports. On the “third” line, the variables representing the exports to
the EU (XNT
eu ) and the presence of a Green campaign (Green), the human development index (HDI) and
the dummy for OECD countries appears to be correlated with the labeling index, whereas the agricultural
share of GDP (AG) and the average willingness to buy GM (WTB1;WTB2) appear to be negatively
correlated with this index.
In the country representation (Figure 4), we ﬁnd the ranking of chemical exports in the horizontal direc-
tion, with the EU, the United States, Germany, Switzerland, India and China on the right side of Axis 2 as
exporters. Along the diagonal, countries are ranked according to their labeling index, from the EU (most
stringent) to the United States (least stringent labeling regime) and a large cluster of countries with no label-
ing policies. Countries higher on the diagonal are likely food exporters to the EU, with consumers opposed14
to GM food as well as having active green NGO campaigns, and countries where agriculture represents a
relatively low share of total GDP. Most of the countries in our data set are close to the center (not well
represented) or in the left lower corner, meaning that they import chemicals, with consumers less opposed
to GM and with rural economies.
Base on our PCA analysis, we can draw three main conclusions:
i) We distinguish three groups of countries according to their labeling policies: ﬁrst, the countries
with a “pragmatic” approach to labeling, that either import or export GM crops and explicitly consider the
cost of the regulations. Second, some countries are linked with the EU and have adopted relatively stringent
regulations. Third, we ﬁnd a group of countries that are caught in the middle, and that have decided to opt
for mandatory labeling regimes, following the approach of the EU or Japan.
ii) European countries and Asian countries that are implementing a labeling policy tend to follow
the labeling regulations of the EU and Japan, respectively. We found that all labeling countries in
Europe are in the second group of countries, with labeling requirements similar to the EU’s. Asian countries
with labeling policies, except China, have adopted mandatory labeling with tolerance levels exceeding 2%,
following the approach of Japan.
iii) Our analysis suggests several possible linear correlations. First the projection of the labeling
index (LBL) variable representing the degree of stringency and cost appeared positively correlated to the
variables representing the share of export of the four crops to the EU and the presence of a green campaign.
The labeling index also appeared negatively correlated to the average consumer willingness-to-buy GMfood
and the agricultural share of GDP.
4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Weemploy regression analysis to further determine which of the above mentioned factors affects GMfood
labeling regulations and to test a set of hypotheses. The characterization of labeling regulations is inherently
multidimensional. We use two econometric approaches to try to explain labeling regulations. First, we
employ a discrete choice approach, by estimating single equation logit models to explain the probability of15
choosing a labeling regulation (as done by Mitchell) and by using a multinomial logit estimation on the type
of labeling regime (no labeling, voluntary labeling, and mandatory labeling). Second we run single equation
linear regressions on three indexes of labeling policies.
Based on the previous literature and the PCA results, we will test the following hypotheses.
i) Is there a (linear or U-shaped) relationship between the level of income and the presence of a par-
ticular type of GM food labeling policy?
ii) Are labeling regulations related to the level of consumer acceptance of GM food or the presence of
a green national campaign?
iii) Are labeling regulations related to the domestic production of GM crops?
iv) Are labeling regulations related to the importance of the chemical industry?6
v) Are food importers more likely to have stringent labeling regulations? Are food exporters less likely
to have labeling requirements?
vi) More speciﬁcally are countries exporting soybeans, corn, cotton or canola to the EU or Japan more
likely to have similar labeling regulations as these two countries? Are countries importing these
crops from the United States less likely to adopt stringent labeling regulations?
vii) Does the participation level in the Cartagena Protocol, WTO membership, or the regional location
affect the regulatory choice of a particular country?
4.1. Discrete choice approach: type of labeling policy.
a) Adoption of labeling requirements
We ﬁrst run simple logit regressions on the adoption of mandatory labeling across countries. We combine
a reduced set of variables to preserve degrees of freedom, and we avoid using any two variables that have
a strong linear correlation in the same regression, in order to reduce the risk of multicollinearity (which
translates into inefﬁcient estimates). The results are shown in Table 2.
6 According to Graff and Zilberman (2004), one of the potential factors in the EU’s opposition to transgenic crops is that the EU has large
chemical companies.16
TABLE 2. Coefﬁcient estimates: simple logit regressions on the dummyfor mandatory
labeling for the 108 countries (Regressions 1& 2) and logit regression on the dummy
for prospective mandatory labeling countries for the 78 non labeling countries (Re-
gression 3).(the standard errors are shown in parenthesis, and * means 10%, ** 5% and
*** 1% level of statistical signiﬁcance)
Dependent variable ML Dependent variable DLTR
Independent Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Variables (for all countries) w/o EU, US, and Japan non labeling countries
SGM -6.17**(2.42) -8.90** (4.50) 23.43 (14.8)
Tr -3.98E-8(4E-7) 7.37E-7(1.3E-6) -7.31E-6***(1.54E-6)
XNT
eu 3.54**(1.40) 3.34**(1.55) -13.52**(6.31)
XT
eu -2.09 (2.05) -2.40(2.35) -3.48 (2.31)
XC
jap 24.5**(11.5) 28.56**(13.8)
Mus -0.32 (1.21) -0.23 (1.18) -0.38 (0.82)
Green 3.42 (2.42) 3.52 (2.3) 1.17 (1.28)
OECD -0.40 (1.18) -0.47 (1.18) -13.95***(5.1)
WTO -3.36 (2.23) -3.45 (2.14) -0.039 (0.98)
HDI 13.96**(6.85) 12.05(7.57) 3.94 (5.35)
CPB -0.87 (0.63) -0.65 (0.70) -1.08*(0.60)
pGDP -3E-4 (2.4E-4) -2.7E-4 (2.2E-4) -0.0004 (4.99)
pGDP 2 6.37E-9 (5.6E-9) 6.3E-9 (5.4E-9) 4.46E-8**(2.1E-8)
AG -6.86(6.05) -6.62(6.1) 1.21 (4.81)
Grwth 71.39***(24.8) 71.6***(27.2) -11.66 (18.6)
Agshexp -4.0 (3.03) -4.90 (3.03) 5.39**(2.22)
Agshimp -0.65 (5.93) -1.04 (7.2) -18.64**(8.19)
Chem -8.5E-7 (3.4E-5) -1.2E-5 (1.3E-5) 4.48E-5**(1.9E-5)
Fert -2.8E-4 (2.2E-4) -1.3E-4 (1.3E-4) -3.55E-4**(1.6E-4)
WTB1 8.76 (8.68) 24.0 (21.8)
Constant -14.56**(6.83) -19.85**(10.1) -0.16 (4.7)
Pseudo R2 0.69 0.66 0.47
First, we use all countries and run a regression on the dependent variable ML, which is equal to 1 if
the country has adopted mandatory labeling as of April 2004, and 0 otherwise (Regression 1). We ﬁnd no
evidence of an inverse-U relationship between the probability of adopting mandatory labeling and income.
The coefﬁcients on the share of exports of soybeans, corn and canola to the EU (XNT
eu ), exports of corn to
Japan (XC
jap), human development index (HDI) and economic growth (Grwth) are positive and signiﬁcant.
Exporters of the four crops (except cotton) mainly to the EU or corn mainly to Japan, countries with higher
levels of development and with positive economic growth are more likely to mandate labeling. At the same
time, the coefﬁcient on the total share of GM crop (SGM) is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Countries
producing GM crops are less likely to have adopted mandatory labeling of GM food.17
The second regression is run without the three potential outliers, Japan, the EU and the United States
on the same set of explanatory variables (Regression 2 in Table 2) to verify our results. Without these
three countries, we conﬁrm the positive relationship between exports of the three food and feed crops to
the EU, exports of corn to Japan, or economic growth and the probability of adopting a mandatory labeling
requirement. Only the human development index (HDI) is no longer explaining the probability of adopting
mandatory labeling.
All the other variables were not statistically signiﬁcant. As in Mitchell (2002), we ﬁnd that imports of
crops from the United States (Mus) do not affect the probability of having a labeling requirement. But
unlike Mitchell, we ﬁnd that there is a correlation between exporting crops to the EU and the probability of
adopting a labeling requirement.
In the third column of Table 2 we present regression results for the dependent variable DLTR equal to
1 for countries considering the use of mandatory labeling and 0 otherwise. We only use countries with no
labeling policies today, to estimate likely factors inﬂuencing future decisions to require the labeling of GM
food. The variables XC
jap and WTB1 are omitted in the estimation to avoid hidden collinearity and perfect
determination of the dependent variables.
We ﬁnd different results (Regression 3). The coefﬁcients on income square (pGDP 2), the share of agri-
culture in total merchandise exports (Agshexp), and the chemical trade balance (Chem) are positive and
signiﬁcant, which implies that these variables increase the probability of plans to adopt mandatory label-
ing. On the other hand, the coefﬁcients on Tr, XNT
eu , OECD, CPB, Agshimp and Fert are negative
and statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, countries expected to require labeling in the near future tend to be net
importers of the four crops, not exporting the three GM food and feed crops to the EU, but for whom agri-
culture represents a large share of total merchandise exports and a relatively small share of total imports. In
other words, they may be exporters of non-GM crops to the EU or elsewhere. Furthermore, these countries
use less fertilizer, they export chemicals, and they are not OECD countries, or not committed to the CPB.18
Finally, these countries are likely to have high or low incomes compared to the ones with no intention to
label.
So if current adopters of mandatory labeling requirements are agricultural exporters with links to the EU
or Japan, are developed countries, and are experiencing positive economic growth, in contrast, prospective
labeling countries tend to be net importers of the four GM crops, exporting non-GM commodities, and not
OECD countries.
b) Mandatory versus voluntary labeling
As a second approach, we take the labeling decision as a choice between three alternative regimes: no label-
ing, voluntary labeling, and mandatory labeling. As in the previous section, we will present the regression
results on past and recent labeling decisions (dependent variable TY P) with all countries, and then run the
same regressions without the three potential outliers (the EU, the United States and Japan). To proceed with
the estimation, we avoid the overuse of dummies and combine meaningful independent variables. In each
case, we present two alternative multinomial logit regressions based on two different set of independent
variables. The results are shown in Table 3.
Regression 4 includes variables on agricultural production and trade, economics and political factors, with
a reasonable Pseudo R-square of 0.6. Regression 5 combines other variables representing mainly political
and economic factors.
First, the variables SGM, Tr,and Chemincrease the probability ofopting for avoluntary labeling policy.
At the same time, the variables Agshimp, Grwth and XT
eu are negatively correlated with this probability.
We also observe a U shaped relationship between the adoption of voluntary labeling and per capita income.
On the one hand, countries producing GM crops, exporting chemicals, that are net exporters of the four
main GM crops are more likely to choose a voluntary labeling policy. On the other hand, countries whose
agricultural imports are relatively important, who export cotton mainly to the EU, or who have a signiﬁcant
economic growth are less likely to opt for voluntary labeling.19
TABLE 3. Estimated coefﬁcients: multinomial logit regressions on thetype of labeling
(TY P). * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level of statistical signiﬁcance.
All countries w/o EU, US and Japan
Variables Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7
Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory
SGM 17.62*** 0.91 19.56*** 2.78
Tr 6.7E-6*** 1.6E-7 7.3E-6*** 6.2E-7
XNT
eu 0.95 1.07** 0.628 0.45
XT
eu -451.1*** -1.44 -452.9*** -1.62
XC
jap -19.22 14.6** -15.36 15.85***
Green 8.0*** 2.74*** 8.21*** 3.04***
Agshexp -32.26*** -6.11*** -34.02*** -6.85***
Chem 3.3E-5** -4.5 E-7 2.3E-5* -9.98E-6*
CPB -9.38** -1.07** -9.35** -1.06**
AG -109.7** -10.93** -109.4** -10.92**
Grwth -166.8* 5.83 -166.4 5.83
Agshimp -249.07*** -11.70 -248.3** -11.7
Mus -0.45 0.41 -0.45 -0.41
HDI 236.9** 16.23*** 236.2** 16.22***
WTB1 33.58 -108.9*** 120.8 -103.7**
pGDP -0.0038** -4.2E-4** -0.004** -4.2E-4**
pGDP 2 7.7E-8** 8.8E-9 7.7E-8** 8.8E-9
SGMT 34.58 65.84*** -48.24* 63.32**
Constant -6.41*** -2.26*** -151.7* 38.28** -6.37*** -2.20*** -188.2*** 36.07*
Pseudo
R2
0.61 0.55 0.56 0.48
Secondly, the probability of implementing a mandatory labeling policy increases with the variables X NT
eu ,
XC
jap, and SGMT. Moreover, the coefﬁcient on WTB1 is negative and signiﬁcant. Countries exporting
the GM food and feed crops to the EU and Japan, who produce GM cotton or who have a lower consumer
acceptance are more likely to have adopted mandatory labeling policies as opposed to voluntary labeling.
Finally for these two regressions, the variables Green and HDI are positively correlated with the adop-
tion of both labeling types, whereas the variables AG, CPB and Agshexp decrease the probability of
introducing both types of labeling. Less developed countries, with no green campaign, but who are com-
mitted to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, with rural economies, and with large agricultural share of
exports in total merchandise exports, are less likely to have adopted any labeling policy. Countries without
labeling may have decided to ratify the Protocol on Biosafety as a substitute for a clear domestic policy on
GM food and crops.20
In comparison, when we omit the three outlying countries (Regressions 6 & 7), we just ﬁnd a few differ-
ences among signiﬁcant factors. In the case of voluntary labeling, we ﬁnd that the factor Grwth is no longer
signiﬁcant whereas SGMT becomes negative and signiﬁcant. For mandatory labeling, the factor XNT
eu is
no longer signiﬁcant, whereas the variable Chem becomes negative and signiﬁcant. These four variables
are partially driven by the outliers in the comparison of the three types of labeling.
4.2. Characteristics of the labeling regulations.
a) First principal component (coverage index)
We use the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator to explain a coverage index (PC1) of labeling deﬁned
as the ﬁrst principal component of the PCA on labeling policies presented in section 3.1. This variable is
correlated with the different types of products covered in the regulations and with the variable on the number
of ingredients required to be labeled.
We include all countries, and we set up a dummy variable equal to 1 for countries with no labeling. To ﬁnd
the proper value for the dependent variable in the countries without labeling, we use the vector of changes
of the original labeling variables to the principal component. We use White’s heteroskedastic consistent
standard errors to take into account the different variances. The regression results of the reduced regressions
(without including insigniﬁcant variables) are shown in the second column (Regression 9) in Table 4.
We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on Green, Grwth, pGDP and XLA
eu are positive and signiﬁcant while the
coefﬁcients on pGDP 2, AG and Fert are negative and signiﬁcant. Thus, countries with an anti-GM green
campaign, positive economic growth, or exporting canola to the EUare more likely to have adopted stringent
regulations. Countries with relatively large rural economies and a large use of fertilizer tend to implement
less stringent regulations (or no labeling regulations). In addition we ﬁnd an inverse U relationship between
per capita income and our dependent variable: countries with low and high income per capita tend to have
less complete regulations than countries with medium income per capita. Finally, the dummy variables on
China (China) and North America (NAM) are positive and signiﬁcant.21
TABLE 4. OLS regressions on the ﬁrst principal component, the tolerance level and
the labeling composite index (the standard errors are indicated in parenthesis, * 10% level,
** 5% and *** 1% level of statistical signiﬁcance)





















China 2.36***(0.31) -2.03***(0.61) 1253.22***(172)
NOLB 1.27E-6***(4.9E-8) 3.75E-7***(1E-7) 6.76E-5***(8.3E-6)
Constant -0.87***(0.078) 0.54*(0.30) 584.28*(298.2)
adj:R2 0.65 0.48 0.73
b) Tolerance level
Weuse the tolerance level as a second characteristic of labeling policies.7 Theresults are reported in the third
column of Table 4 (Regression 10). We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on SGM NT, Green, Grwth, and ASI,
are positive and signiﬁcant, while the coefﬁcients on TrT, and SAM are negative and signiﬁcant. Thus
countries producing GM soybeans, corn, or canola, with a green campaign, a positive economic growth,
or located in Asia are more likely to choose a higher tolerance level. At the same time, countries that are
net exporters of cotton, or that are located in South America are more likely to have a low tolerance level.
Countries with no labeling policies have a tolerance level of 0 by default, and the dummy variable NoLB
is negative and signiﬁcant as expected. In addition the dummies on China and the European Union (EUN)
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, as expected.
7 The tolerance level is strongly correlated with the second principal component of our ﬁrst PCA.22
c) Stringency and cost of labeling
As a third approach, we use the labeling index LBL deﬁned by equation (1) in section 3.2. It is computed
as a ratio of factors (including TOL) representing the coverage and the cost of the labeling regulations.
We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on TrLA, pGDP, XNT
eu and Chem are positive and signiﬁcant, whereas
the coefﬁcients on SGM, pGDP 2, and WTBav (variable deﬁned as the average between WTB1 and
WTB2) are negative and signiﬁcant. Thus countries with the highest index of strictness are exporters to
the EU, exporters of canola, and chemical exporters. Countries producing GM and with a larger consumer
acceptance of GM food have adopted less stringent and less costly regulations overall. Finally we conﬁrm
the inverse U relationship between the degree of stringency and the income level.
4.3. Synthesis of the results.
We summarize our results by answering the questions posed at the beginning of this section.
i) Countries with low or high income per capita are less likely to have a stringent labeling policy, and
more likely to have a voluntary labeling policy or no labeling policy. We ﬁnd an inverse U relationship
between GDP per capita and the coverage index, as well as the composite labeling index. We ﬁnd a U
shaped relationship between per capita income and the adoption of voluntary labeling. These relationships
should be interpreted carefully, because the implicit intermediate income countries include a large range of
per capita incomes from China at the low end to countries of the EU at the high end. Furthermore, we cannot
verify this relationship in our analysis of the factors of adoption of mandatory labeling policies. Besides,
we ﬁnd that countries that are planning the introduction of labeling policies tend to have relatively higher
incomes among the group of countries with no current labeling policy.
ii) Countries that have no green campaigns tend to have no labeling policies. Countries with a lower
level of consumer acceptance of GM are more likely to opt for a stringent mandatory labeling policy.
The variable measuring the presence of a double green campaign (Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth)
is positive and signiﬁcant for both voluntary and mandatory labeling in the multinomial logit estimations,23
meaning that it reduces the chance of having no labeling policy. Furthermore, the coefﬁcient on the dummy
Green is positively correlated with the coverage and composite labeling index but also with the tolerance
level. The only caveat to these results is the possibility of simultaneity, because the Green variable was
measured in 2003 after many labeling decisions were already in place.
Apart from that, we found that countries with lower consumer acceptance are more likely to have a
stringent labeling policy rather than no labeling policy, and to have opted for mandatory labeling rather than
voluntary labeling. However, our measurement of consumer acceptance is approximate.
iii) Countries that have been producing or that are producing GM crops are more likely to have
implemented voluntary labeling or less stringent labeling policies. We found that the variables associ-
ated with the production of GM crops increases the likelihood of opting for voluntary labeling rather than
mandatory labeling, and that they increase the likelihood of having lower coverage and labeling indexes.
The exception is the case of GM cotton, as it appears that countries with GM cotton tend to have mandatory
labeling requirements for GM food.
iv) Exports of agricultural chemicals (pesticides, insecticides, and herbicides) are correlated with
stringent and voluntary labeling policies. Countries with intensive agriculture, as measured by fertil-
izer usage, tend to have less complete labeling regulations. We found that the chemical trade balance is
positively correlated with the labeling index and the probability of opting for voluntary labeling. In addi-
tion, the variable on fertilizer consumption is negatively correlated with the coverage index. But these two
factors were determined partially by the outlying countries (EU, US and Japan). In addition we found that
countries who have indicated their intention to implement mandatory labeling are exporters of chemicals
and low fertilizer users.
v) Countries exporting mainly agricultural commodities are more likely to have avoided labeling
GM food. Countries importing mainly agricultural commodities are less likely to opt for voluntary
labeling. Countries exporting the main four GM crops are more likely to opt for voluntary labeling.
The coefﬁcient on Agshexp was negative for both types of labeling in the multinomial logit regressions. In24
contrast, countries considering the labeling of GM food are more likely to be exporting a signiﬁcant share of
agricultural commodities. The coefﬁcient on Tr was positive for voluntary labeling. Among the exporters
of cotton that have adopted labeling we found that they were more likely to have chosen a low tolerance
level.
vi) Countries exporting soybeans, corn and canola mainly to the European Union are more likely
to choose a stringent mandatory labeling regime. Countries exporting corn mainly to Japan are more
likely to adopt a mandatory labeling regime. We found the variable XNT
eu correlated with the index of
labeling and with a positive coefﬁcient on the adoption of mandatory labeling. The variable X C
jap is also
a signiﬁcant explanatory factor for the adoption of mandatory labeling. In contrast, we did not ﬁnd that
the shares of imports of the four crops from the United States were correlated with the type of labeling
regulation.
vii) Membership to the WTO is not related to labeling decisions. Participation in the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) is higher among countries with no labeling requirements. At the regional
level, Asiatic countries are more likely to implement labeling regulations with higher tolerance levels.
In addition, we found that among the countries with no labeling today, the ones committed to the CPB were
less likely to opt for the adoption of a labeling policy in the near future. Thus the CPB acts as a default
regulation for countries without any position on labeling.
viii) Finally, less developed countries with low human development index, and relatively large ru-
ral economies are less likely to adopt any labeling policy, and countries experiencing larger economic
growth are more likely to implement mandatory labeling with relatively more products covered and
a high tolerance level. The variable AG is negatively correlated with the coverage index, and it is also
negatively correlated with the adoption of voluntary or mandatory labeling. The variable Grwth as posi-
tively correlated with the coverage index, the tolerance level, and the probability of opting for a mandatory
labeling regime25
5. CONCLUSION
Many countries have decided to implement labeling regimes for genetically modiﬁed food and the regu-
lations differ widely across the world. In this paper we conducted a cross-national comparison of GM food
labeling regulations, and tried to explain why countries choose to label, and why some opt for a speciﬁc
labeling regime.
We found that we can group labeling countries into three categories. The ﬁrst group includes the adopters
of GM technology (such as the United States and Canada), and exporters or importers of the major GM
crops (e.g., Japan), who adopted pragmatic labeling regulations. The second group is connected with the
European Union (EU) and implemented costly and more complete GM labeling systems. The third group
is caught between the ﬁrst two, and adopted labeling systems comparable to the EU or to Japan, or they are
considering labeling policies that resemble one of these two.
We considered three sources of explanations for GM labeling policies: domestic political factors (con-
sumer and producer preferences), international trade factors (trade dependency and trade relationships) and
macro economic factors (income, importance of agriculture). Based on a cross-national data set of 108
countries, we ﬁrst found that countries labeling GM food are usually more developed, and less dependent on
agriculture. Furthermore, countries that did not adopt any labeling policy tend to be ratifying parties of the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and do not present anti-GM campaigns from green NGOs. Then among
labeling options, we found that some political and trade variables were relevant explanatory variables. On
the one hand, countries producing GM crops tend to adopt more pragmatic and less costly labeling policies,
and large exporters of cotton, corn, soybeans and canola tend to adopt voluntary labeling. On the other
hand, countries with low consumer acceptance, exporting soybeans, corn, or canola mainly to the EU or
corn mainly to Japan are more likely to mandate the labeling of GM food. Among these, countries in Asia
or exporting corn mainly to Japan are more likely to have a relative higher threshold level for the adventi-
tious presence of GM ingredients and to regulate only a restricted number of ingredients in each product.26
In contrast, countries located in Europe or exporting mainly corn, soybean and canola to the EU are more
likely to have very stringent and costly policies, with low threshold levels and all ingredients covered.
Interestingly, in the transatlantic comparison of opposite policy approaches, consumers and producers
seem to ﬁnd advantage in their own countries’ choice of labeling policy. This conﬁrms the thesis of Caswell
(2000) that each country will choose its own labeling regime to respond to its economic and political in-
terests. Our results also support the conclusions of Anderson and Jackson (2003) and Graff and Zilberman
(2004), that production factors are determinants of transatlantic differences in biotechnology regulations.
These results partially contradict the prediction of Fulton and Giannakas (2004), who concluded that con-
sumers, producers and seed companies never agree as to which labeling option to choose.
Apart from OECD countries, who seem to have made choices according to their own national interest, we
can comment on labeling choices in less developed countries. Regional inﬂuence and trade relationship are
important factors in the determination of labeling policies in poor countries. We found that Asian countries
tend to adopt similar regulations as Japan, and European countries tend to follow EU regulations. The trade
factors are more important than the consumer or green factors. In particular, transition countries like Brazil,
China and Russia have adopted mandatory labeling of GM food without surveying their consumers. The
main remaining factors in our study are production choices and exports to the EU and to Japan. These three
factors combined may partially explain the regulations in transition countries.
While this study provides some interesting results, many questions remain and further work should strive
to obtain an improved data set. First, more countries would increase the efﬁciency of our estimations.
We would like to include data on bilateral trade of all crops with the EU, Japan, and the United States.
As regulations get published, and enter into force, this will reduce the potential measurement error on the
regulation variables. In addition, it would be worthwhile to ﬁnd a more adequate variable to represent
consumer acceptance.27
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TABLE 5. Summary Statistics
Variables Notation Mean Standard Dev.
Type of label TY P 0.833 0.971
Dummy future mandatory labeling DLTR 0.157 0.366
Tolerance level in % TOL 0.856 1.682
Number of ingredients ING 3.463 6.233
Dummy Feed included FEED 0.046 0.211
Dummy Meat included MEAT 0.009 0.096
Dummy labeling enforced in 2004 ENF 0.130 0.337
Dummy Food derived from GM DER 0.065 0.247
Dummy Restaurants REST 0.037 0.190
Dummy Additives ADD 0.046 0.211
Dummy Flavors FLV 0.028 0.165
Total GM crops area (Mha) TotGM 1668 11790
Share of GM corn SGMC 0.008 0.044
Share of GM soy SGMS 0.035 0.161
Share of GM cotton SGMT 0.020 0.119
Share of GM canola SGMLA 0.015 0.108
Trade balance of corn (mmt) TrC -18933 5236443
Trade balance of soy (mmt) TrS -96353 3479214
Trade balance of cotton (mmt) TrT -5745 210745
Trade balance of canola (mmt) TrLA -7226 512991
Share of corn exports sent to Japan XC
jap 0.016 0.063
Share of corn exports sent to the EU XC
eu 0.094 0.240
Share of soy exports sent to the EU XS
eu 0.106 0.248
Share of cotton exports sent to the EU XT
eu 0.147 0.232
Share of canola exports sent tot the EU XLA
eu 0.089 0.237
Imports of Corn from the US MC
us 0.278 0.358
Imports of soy from the US MS
us 0.206 0.309
Imports of cotton from the US MT
us 0.145 0.258
Share of agriculture in total exports Agshexp 0.244 0.233
Share of agriculture in total imports Agshimp 0.158 0.097
Average trade balance in pesticides Pest 10547 243322
Average trade balance in insecticides Insc 6224 67662
Average trade balance in herbicides Herb 2425 86820
Average consumption of fertilizers Fert 1731 4591
Dummy member to the WTO WTO 0.75 0.435
Commitment to the Cartagena Protocol CPB 1.037 0.772
Double dummy green campaign Green 0.579 0.688
Dummy member of the OECD OECD 0.241 0.429
Human Development Index HDI 0.672 0.179
Consumer willingness-to-buy GMF (1) WTB1 0.423 0.041
Consumer willingness-to-buy GMF (2) WTB2 0.560 0.102
Per capita GDP PGDG 5239.5 8372.4
Average economic growth Grwth 0.030 0.0265
Share of agricultural GDP AG 0.184 0.156
Dummy Africa AFR 0.343 0.477
Dummy Asia (excl. Middle East) ASI 0.222 0.418
Dummy Europe EUR 0.167 0.374
Dummy Middle-East MDE 0.065 0.247
Dummy North America NAM 0.028 0.165
Dummy South America SAM 0.148 0.357